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ABSTRACT 
The perspective of equity practitioners is distinct and offers unparalleled insight into the actual effectiveness of employment equity 
policy. As an employment equity practitioner within an engineering firm and its parent company, 1 achieved only marginal success 
for two main reasons. First, executives and managers refused to recognize and deal with employment equity, especially equity for 
women, as a business issue. Second, our efforts were hampered by the lack of effective equity legislation. 
RESUME 
La perspective des praticiens en matiere d'equite est distincte et permet de penetrer I'efficacite de la politique de l'equite en matiere 
d'emploi de facon hors pair. En tant que praticien de l'equite en matiere d'emploi dans une firme d'ingenieurs et de sa maison mere, 
je n'ai eu qu'un succes negligeable pour deux raisons principales. D'abord, les cadres et les gestionaires ont refuse de reconnaitre et 
de se charger de l'equite en matiere d'emploi, surtout lorsqu'il s'agissait de l'equite pour les femmes, en tant que question d'affaire 
Deuxiemement, nos effort sont ete entraves par le manque d'efficacite de la loi sur l'equite. 
When I joined the workforce, nearly three 
decades ago, the office was a different place. 
Aside from the absence of computers, fax 
machines and voicemail, back then men and 
women seldom performed the same type of work. 
Thirty years ago, want ads were classified by 
gender. In the office, women's roles were usually 
supportive of those of men and were paid 
considerably less. Sexual harassment, as a legal 
concept, did not exist although those of us who 
experienced it knew what it was. I clearly 
remember my first job. A man with the power to 
grant me a promotion explained that in exchange 
for a raise he expected "a wife in the office." I felt 
angry, yet powerless to change things. At that time 
1 had no other option but to quit. 
Since then 1 have had the privilege of 
working with, and learning from, a number of 
outstanding women and men. Educated in the 
understanding of the various forms of 
discrimination, many have experienced sexism, 
racism, heterosexism and/or able-bodyism first-
hand; they never hesitate to deal with it head on. 
Through the tireless efforts of many women and 
men who demanded changes by using various 
strategies, such as unionizing, confronting 
harassers, and filing complaints with human rights 
organizations, the workplace has been improved. 
In addition to the dedication and hard work of 
individuals and lobby groups, the federal 
government instituted employment equity 
legislation. 
Intended as a proactive strategy to deal 
with workplace discrimination, the Employment 
Equity Act (EEA) was proclaimed by the federal 
government in 1986. The E E A was established: 
to achieve equality in the work place so 
that no person shall be denied 
employment opportunities or benefits for 
reasons unrelated to ability and, in the 
fulfillment of that goal, to correct the 
conditions of disadvantage in 
employment experienced by women, 
aboriginal peoples, persons with 
disabilities and persons who are, because 
of their race or colour, in a visible 
m inority in Canada by giving effect to the 
principle that employment equity means 
more than treating persons in the same 
way but also requires special measures 
and the accommodation of difference.' 
Lofty, praiseworthy ideals indeed. Yet 
from the inception of equity legislation, the federal 
government was more concerned about placating 
business than making real change in the economic 
lives of members of the groups designated in the 
Act. The Abella Commission, which was struck to 
investigate inequality in the workplace and whose 
work was largely responsible for the EEA, 
proposed the use of the term "employment equity" 
instead of the American phrase "affirmative 
action." The reason for the new term was that 
quotas, a part of the American Equal Employment 
Opportunity program, were considered potentially 
too divisive. Abella stated that, "In creating our 
own program in Canada, we may not wish to use 
quotas and we should therefore seriously consider 
calling it something else if we want to avoid ... 
intellectual resistance and confusion."2 This 
recommendation was incorporated into the 1986 
EEA and, as a result, instead of being accountable 
for filling quotas, employers covered by the act 
were encouraged simply to set goals and 
timetables. 
As a companion to the EEA, but not 
included in the legislation, the federal government 
developed the Federal Contractors Program (FCP) 
"To ensure that the federal contractors who do 
business with the Government of Canada achieve 
and maintain a fair and representative workforce. " 3 
This program only affected suppliers who 
employed more than one hundred people and bid 
on federal contracts worth $200,000 or more.4 For 
suppliers meeting these criteria, the senior 
executive of the company had to certify in writing 
his or her commitment to implement employment 
equity measures, defined by the federal 
government as "the identification and removal of 
barriers to the selection, hiring, promotion and 
training of members of the [four] designated 
groups."5 Under the FCP, suppliers were also 
encouraged to increase the representation of the 
designated groups throughout their organization. 
Has the federal employment equity 
program been successful? Based on my 
experience, and those of five colleagues in the 
engineering industry, only marginally. The 
principle obstacle we commonly experienced was 
the refusal of executives and managers to 
recognize and deal with employment equity as a 
business issue. The lack of executive and 
managerial commitment to employment equity 
was not improved by the FCP because one of the 
major weaknesses of the program is that it is the 
intent to implement employment equity, and not 
the improvement in representation for designated 
group members, on which employers were 
audited. Finally, the FCP did not address 
socialization factors, such as the male dominance 
of the engineering profession, educational systems 
which channel young girls away from studying 
mathematics and science and university 
engineering faculties which were not "women 
friendly." 
I personally became involved with 
employment equity in 1990. During this time, I 
was hired as a human resources practitioner for a 
newly established high tech company which I will 
refer to as "NewCo." Several days into my new 
job, I was reviewing files left by my predecessor. 
One of the files was entitled "Employment 
Equity." The more I read the information in this 
file, the more excited 1 became. Finally, the 
government had recognized the inequalities 
women and members of other groups experience 
in the Canadian workplace, and here was 
legislation designed to address this issue. I thought 
I had found the golden key. This legislation was 
going to improve the working lives of those who, 
although skilled, hard-working and motivated, had 
difficulty in achieving rewarding and well-paying 
work. 
First, I spent time developing a better 
understanding of the meaning of "employment 
equity." It was the FCP which impacted NewCo. 
The government provided a wealth of written 
material. I was later to discover that was basically 
all the government provided. What resulted was 
primarily an exercise in administrative record 
keeping. Over the years, a tremendous amount of 
research had been completed, reports written, 
statistics collected, all of which proved the 
inequality and discrimination members of the 
designated groups experienced in the workplace. 
But real change was not desired by organizations, 
including government, and so business continued 
unabated by ineffectual equity legislation. 
However, the ineffectiveness of this legislation 
was not readily apparent to me, and it would take 
some time working with it before I was able to 
clearly see it for what it was - a ruse. Without 
changing the status quo, the government could 
point to this act as a means of showing its 
recognition of the discrimination many voters 
experienced. 
Late in 1990, NewCo embarked on a 
recruitment strategy that would almost double its 
workforce over the next four years. Because 
representation of the four designated groups 
throughout the organization was low, 1 thought it 
an opportune time to convince the company's 
executive to implement employment equity 
initiatives. 
In January 1991, I presented a business 
case in support of the implementation of 
employment equity to the Manager, and Vice 
President, of Human Resources. The Vice 
President then discussed what I had prepared with 
the company's President. 
The business case I developed was based 
on the following points: 
1) As NewCo employed over one 
hundred people and would probably bid 
on contracts for the federal government 
worth $200,000 or more, the company 
should start to implement employment 
equity immediately, rather than waiting 
until a contract was bid on. The amount 
of work required to implement 
employment equity initiatives was 
extensive. 
2) NewCo provided substantial amounts 
of services to the Ontario government, as 
well as having two offices in Ontario. 
The (then) new NDP government had 
published its intention to implement 
employment equity legislation, and 
NewCo should be ready to meet the 
resulting requirements. 
3) NewCo also provided services in the 
United States and had already been 
requested by several US cities and states 
to supply information on equity 
initiatives within the company. 
4) As NewCo was embarking on a period 
of significant recruitment, primarily for 
engineers and software developers, it 
should position itself as an employer of 
choice so that it could attract the best 
graduates which were increasingly men 
who were members of visible minorities. 
5) As NewCo expanded its market 
internationally, this expansion could be 
facilitated by a greater understanding of, 
and responsiveness to, other cultures 
which would be made possible if those 
cultures were represented within 
NewCo's workforce. 
The President of NewCo agreed to 
support employment equity primarily in response 
to government requirements. Following my 
suggestion, the President issued a letter to all 
NewCo's employees outlining his support. 
Although four of the five points outlined in the 
business case I had developed had the potential of 
directly affecting the company's success (attracting 
top talent, improving the global sales strategy), the 
viewpoint adopted by NewCo's executive was that 
employment equity was merely a government 
requirement that should be met without 
significantly changing the way its business was 
done. I was given responsibility for employment 
equity, but without much in the way of support or 
resources. The letter was essentially the end of the 
President's involvement and interest in 
employment equity. The only other direction I 
received from the executive was to "keep us out of 
trouble." 
Other business initiatives, such as new 
product development, recruitment, and opening up 
new global markets, were clearly initiated and 
directed by NewCo's executive. Such initiatives 
were treated by the executive as business issues 
critical to the success of NewCo. Employment 
equity, by contrast, was viewed as a government 
program, and not as an initiative to be integrated 
with other business concerns, such as recruitment 
and the opening of new global markets. From the 
start, then, employment equity was marginalized 
within NewCo and viewed by the executive and 
managers as a separate and less significant 
responsibility of the Human Resources 
Department: more specifically, me. 
Aside from the President's concern for 
government requirements, there was an additional 
reason why his letter of support was issued so 
quickly. The parent company of NewCo, which I 
will refer to as BD1, was at this same time in the 
process of resurrecting its attempts at 
implementing employment equity. Because the 
President of NewCo reported directly to one of the 
senior executives of BDI, the latter company often 
determined the programs, policies and procedures 
which NewCo was expected to follow. 
Employment equity was not one of the initiatives 
that BDI specifically directed NewCo to 
implement, but because BDI was doing some work 
on employment equity, the President of NewCo 
asked me to work with those in the parent 
company who were also trying to establish 
employment equity. 
BDI had dealt with employment equity in 
a sporadic way. In 1986, shortly after the federal 
bill on employment equity was enacted, BDI 
issued a memo supporting employment equity. 
The President, it said, would develop the "overall 
philosophy of Employment Equity by establishing 
affirmative action as a major company objective 
and assigning accountability for those objectives at 
all levels and in all groups." BDI then moved to 
the next step of the process outlined by the FCP, a 
self-identification survey of all its Canadian 
divisions. After this initial burst of activity, 
however, employment equity was virtually 
forgotten for the next four years. The survey data 
was not updated and quickly lost its validity. 
It was not until 1990, when BDI was 
experiencing strong competition in the hiring of 
new engineering graduates, that it created an 
"Employer of Choice" initiative in order to attract 
top engineering graduates from universities across 
North America. As well as going to many 
university campuses for recruitment interviews, 
and offering multi-year contracts of guaranteed 
employment, part of the Employer of Choice 
initiative was a renewal of BDI's commitment to 
employment equity. This was viewed as a strategy 
which would attract recent graduates, whose 
makeup was becoming increasingly more diverse. 
That year, BDI gave a white, non-disabled male 
responsibility for reactivating employment equity; 
several months later, he resigned. 
The position was then given to a white, 
non-disabled woman," Wilma," who would also be 
responsible for employee relations. Reporting to a 
Vice President, her new title was Manager of 
Employee Relations. Wilma's office was located in 
BDI's headquarters. Her first task was the 
development of a network (in April 1991) of 
employment equity representatives. The network 
was comprised of regional representatives and 
location-specific representatives. I was both a 
regional and location-specific representative. 
Although Wilma nominally headed the network, 
because its members were appointed by managers 
from the regions and locations, we did not report 
directly to her; and since the reporting structure 
tended to undercut Wilma's authority, it was an 
effective marginalization strategy. 
From the beginning, we had trouble 
obtaining executive and senior management level 
support for employment equity. When we 
proposed a plan for implementation of 
employment equity initiatives, with the goal of 
winning an award from the federal government 
that could be used as part of the publicity 
developed forthe "Employer of Choice" initiative, 
the Vice President responsible for employment 
equity informed Wilma that it was "corny to try 
and win an award in employment equity." 
Even amongst those of us assigned to 
participate in the network, there were problems. 
Two of our colleagues immediately informed us 
that they did not support employment equity and 
that they were only involved because they had 
been assigned to this project by their managers. 
We had no authority over who was assigned to 
work on employment equity, so they were left in 
place. Those of us who did support employment 
equity found that, because our employment equity 
responsibilities were not given priority by our 
management, we had little worktime to devote to 
the development of initiatives. 
One of the first initiatives completed by 
the network was to create and publish, near the 
end of 1991, a four-page bulletin announcing the 
establishment of employment equity, explaining 
why it was necessary, and introducing the people 
who could be contacted for additional information. 
Part of the information supporting the need for 
employment equity in this bulletin was statistical 
information drawn from the 1986 self-
identification survey. This statistical data showed 
unambiguously the low representation of the four 
designated groups within BDI. Although this 
bulletin was only intended for employees, one of 
BDI's lawyers argued against the release of the 
statistics. Her concern was that "our dirty laundry" 
would become public when employees took these 
bulletins home. The bulletin was published 
anyway, and there were no negative repercussions. 
Although these concerns were proven to be 
groundless, the fact that they were referred to as 
"dirty laundry" indicated to us that at least some 
executives within BDI recognized the company's 
poor record in creating a diverse workforce. 
In late 1991, we requested that the 
President of BDI sign a statement in support of 
employment equity similar to the letter issued 
earlier in the year by the President of its 
subsidiary, NewCo, which would then be 
distributed to all BDI and NewCo employees. The 
intent of the statement was to demonstrate top-
level support for this initiative and, thereby, 
increase the support and participation of the 
various levels of management within both 
companies. The President refused to sign, 
demanding instead to know why employment 
equity was necessary. Wilma explained the 
necessity to the President and, although he then 
stated he understood the necessity for employment 
equity, he still refused to sign the statement. In the 
end, we had to settle for the Vice President of 
Human Resources signing the statement. When the 
President did not support employment equity, it 
was further marginalized because his refusal 
reinforced the perception held by many of the 
company's managers and employees that, rather 
than a business issue which could improve 
business viability, employment equity was just 
another government administrative requirement 
which would best be handled by the Human 
Resources Department as this is where the 
information required by the FCP resided. 
Wilma soon experienced the same 
workload problems the rest of us were facing, in 
that other responsibilities, such as overseeing a 
world-wide employee satisfaction survey, 
prevented her from giving the start-up of the 
equity initiative her full attention. Eventually 
Wilma asked for and obtained another position 
outside employment equity because of her 
frustrations in trying to implement employment 
equity with so little support from the executive and 
senior management of BDI. 
Her experience of lack of support led 
Wilma to recommend that her replacement be a 
white, non-disabled man. She believed that a white 
man would more easily gain credibility in the 
white, male-dominated headquarters of BDI. Her 
belief appeared to be justified. Not only was her 
replacement, "John," given a higher grade, salary 
and title (Director), than she had had, but when he 
proposed that BDI develop an employment equity 
plan which would win a federal government 
award, the Vice President who had previously 
called this "corny" now thought it was a wonderful 
idea. 
John was able to push the administrative 
aspects of employment equity a bit further along. 
He successfully obtained the signatures of BDI's 
President and Vice President of Human Resources 
on a statement of support which appeared on the 
redesigned self-identification survey forms. The 
value of this commitment became apparent in the 
wake of BDI's winning (in January 1992) a $5 
million contract with the federal government. 
Under the FCP, the contract meant that BDI's 
employment equity program would be audited. 
Nevertheless, four months later when the President 
of BDI sent his business objective6 for the year to 
the President of NewCo, there was no mention of 
employment equity or the fact that the company 
needed to prepare for a federal government audit, 
something which involves a significant amount of 
work, especially when very little had yet been 
done in regard to employment equity initiatives. 
(The insensitivity to equity issues was evident in a 
detail of the memo outlining the organization's 
objectives: it used only male pronouns.) 
But the chief obstacle to further progress 
was the absence of funding. The network Wilma 
had earlier established still, a year and a half later, 
had no budget and dedicated human resources, and 
those of us who had been assigned this additional 
role were finding it increasingly more difficult to 
dedicate any of our paid working time to equity 
initiatives. Prior to John taking over responsibility 
for employment equity, we had presented a budget 
to senior executives estimating the financial and 
human resources needed to successfully jump-start 
the employment equity program BDI had 
committed itself to under FCP. The budget request 
was denied. 
John decided that a budget was crucial to 
the success of the employment equity program and 
invited a well-known, external consultant, one 
specializing in employment equity issues, to speak 
to the two Vice Presidents of Human Resources. 
John's plan was that, once these men realized the 
need for resources, they would convince BDI's 
President to allocate funds. (The President had also 
been invited to the consultant's presentation, but 
did not attend.) When the consultant started the 
meeting by asking the senior Vice President, 
Human Resources what the status of employment 
equity was within BDI, we were surprised to hear 
from the Vice President about all the work BDI 
was doing in regard to employment equity. After 
a few minutes, however, it was clear that the only 
solid example he had was some past work John 
had done in an aboriginal community prior to his 
taking the employment equity position. I and an 
equally frustrated colleague finally interrupted the 
Vice President and said that, in reality, very little 
had been accomplished within BDI in regard to 
employment equity. We cited the main reason: 
equity initiatives did not get the funding, 
promotion and dedicated human resources which 
other initiatives had received. We also stated that 
the discriminatory hiring and promotion practices 
within BDI sent a clear message that the company 
was not genuinely interested in changing the way 
it did business. The Vice President recovered 
quickly and said that employment equity was 
important, that it had to be implemented. He said 
it was the network's responsibility to get the job 
done: "don't worry about the costs." The meeting 
broke up. 
But nothing changed. The network 
received neither a financial nor a human resources 
budget. In September 1992, we attempted, once 
again, to secure a budget for employment equity, 
but we were not successful. 
By this time, those of us still committed 
to employment equity felt like we were swimming 
against a very strong current. The most significant 
indicator of the lack of support for employment 
equity was the response by BDI's executive to the 
notification that the federal government would 
audit BDI in August 1992. BDI was not prepared 
for an audit, and John immediately requested, and 
received, a four-week postponement from the 
auditor. When it became clear to John that the 
additional four weeks would not be enough time to 
prepare for the audit, he negotiated with the 
auditor to extend the audit date to February 1993. 
In spite of the obvious problems with meeting the 
requirements of the FCP audit, no budget was 
allotted to employment equity. However, in early 
1993, John established the Diversity Steering 
Committee. Comprised of eight senior human 
resources and line managers, they were expected 
to become employment equity "champions" in 
their respective divisions. The Diversity Steering 
Committee met several times, but was disbanded 
shortly after it was created as a result of changing 
priorities within BDI. 
Having successfully postponed the audit 
by six months, John contracted two studies from 
different consultants, an employment systems 
review and a study of BDI's "culture." The first 
was a review and evaluation of BDI's documents 
and practices in regard to human resource 
management. Completed in February 1993, the 
study was to identify systems and procedures 
which were weak, over-emphasized, misused or 
non-existent, and which, as a result, might have an 
adverse impact on designated group members. 
This study produced thirty-four recommendations 
to improve BDI's management of its human 
resources. The consultant noted that no evidence 
of an employment equity policy was found, and 
the employees interviewed for the study were 
unaware of any employment equity initiatives. 
The second study grew out of John's (and 
his US counterpart's) concern about the failure of 
the company's executive to view employment 
equity as a business issue. The purpose of this 
study was to identify BDI's culture and its 
implications for diversity. The study approached 
this by identifying who succeeded, how people 
were promoted and developed, by comparing 
diversity policies with practices, and by finding 
out what BDI's employees thought the company 
should be doing about diversity. John, my other 
equity colleagues, and I hoped that the results of 
this study in particular would finally convince 
BDI's executive of the need for employment equity 
by redefining it as a business issue which, if 
ignored, would negatively impact on the business. 
The Canadian portion of the study consisted of 
interviews with thirty-one senior managers across 
Canada, twenty-eight focus groups and a review of 
various BDI data (including the employment 
systems review study noted above). 
The study was completed in the spring of 
1994, and it identified a number of strengths in 
regard to diversity issues within BDI. One of the 
more significant findings was a recognition that 
diversity was getting onto the corporate agenda 
despite business challenges, as a result of pockets 
of interest, concern and activity around diversity 
which existed within the company. Many of the 
survey and interview respondents felt that the 
company had made some advances in employment 
equity. For example, entry level hiring was fairly 
representative of the diversity within the 
population, the sexual harassment awareness 
training was successful, and the extension of 
benefits without regard to sexual orientation was 
seen as progressive. 
The study also identified some major 
weaknesses in BDI, highlighting them as the 
primary obstacles to employment equity; they 
were the same obstacles which the network had 
been unsuccessfully presenting to BDI's executive 
for years. One of the main weaknesses was a hard-
nosed, tough, aggressive, macho culture which 
was not conducive to diversity. Also identified was 
that employment equity had few executive 
champions or open supporters and was treated as 
an issue for the human resources department, not 
a line management issue. As a result, employment 
equity was not given priority or treated as a valid 
business issue. In support of their identifying these 
obstacles, respondents referred to the lack of an 
articulated, coordinated diversity strategy, and the 
lackadaisical approach to assigning resources to 
work on employment equity. Respondents further 
indicated that the inflexible management style, the 
ambivalence and resentment regarding 
employment equity and the "glass ceiling" for 
women and minorities also provided obstacles to 
diversity within BDI. The report noted also that 
there was a general skepticism among respondents 
that BDI would embrace diversity and act on the 
findings of this study. In short, the study amply 
confirmed the perceptions of those of us who had 
worked on employment equity at BDI of the status 
of diversity issues within the organization. 
When the report from the consultant was 
finalized, however, BDI's executive informed the 
senior managers that the study would remain 
confidential. It would not be released to BDI as a 
whole. There has been no indication that either the 
executive or senior management of BDI has used 
the information from the study in any way. 
John himself had already moved out of 
employment equity before the study was 
completed. He was concerned that his career 
would be seriously hampered if he spent too much 
time working with such an unpopular issue. At the 
time he left, although BDI had still not been able 
to prepare for the audit, the executive decided that 
John would not be immediately replaced. The 
employment equity network was disbanded, 
although some of us continued, on our own 
initiative, to work on employment equity within 
our locations. Responsibility for employment 
equity was eventually given to another white, non-
disabled male whose main responsibilities lay 
elsewhere. 
Due to his additional responsibilities, the 
person responsible for employment equity was not 
happy that he was given responsibility for 
employment equity and indicated to me that he 
was only prepared to do "the bare minimum in 
order to pass the audit." When this individual left 
BDI in February 1994, he was not immediately 
replaced. 
Still facing the audit in the fall of 1994, 
BDI resurrected employment equity. This time, 
responsibility was given to a recently hired, white, 
non-disabled, male Human Resources trainee with 
no experience in employment equity. By early 
1995, the status of employment equity within BDI 
and NewCo remained the same, and the audit, 
though now begun, was still incomplete. BDI 
received no penalty in spite of the fact that, after 
two and a half years, they were still not prepared 
to have the federal government audit their 
employment equity program. 
By this time, all of us involved in the 
original network moved on to other positions. 
Although the attempt to implement employment 
equity was often a frustrating experience, my 
colleagues and I did make some in-roads. For 
example, we established a comprehensive sexual 
harassment program. We were able to raise the 
awareness of diversity issues amongst a number of 
individuals. Representation of some of the 
designated groups, primarily visible minority men, 
was increased within entry level positions. 
However, this increase had more to do with 
business necessity than with employment equity 
initiatives. 
As a way of dealing with the frustration, 
I decided to use my work as the basis for an M A 
thesis. After discovering that my experiences were 
similar to those of five colleagues in the high tech 
industry, my thesis concluded that those of us 
assigned the task of implementing employment 
equity initiatives within engineering companies 
have been only marginally successful. The main 
barrier to our success was the refusal of executives 
and managers to recognize and deal with 
employment equity, especially equity for women, 
as an issue intrinsic to the success of their 
business. Of course, this was not logical because 
these companies all faced a serious shortfall in the 
supply of needed technical employees. 
Management's refusal to recognize equality in 
employment as a business issue was reinforced 
both by the institutional and systemic structure of 
the male-dominated engineering profession and 
the lack of substantial legislation to enforce 
employment equity. 
The requirement to implement 
employment equity through the Federal 
Contractors Program (FCP) generated similar 
responses from executives within all the 
engineering companies in my study. For example, 
one of the employment equity practitioners told of 
a senior executive who expressed concern that a 
"customer" - the federal government - was telling 
him how to run his business. Another practitioner 
was asked by members of the executive what the 
minimum effort necessary would be in order to 
meet the requirements of the FCP. A third 
practitioner noted that, because the work the 
company was doing for the federal government 
was coming to an end, the executives said, "Well, 
why should we worry about it?" The executives in 
this company seemed unconcerned over the 
possibility that discontinuing work on employment 
equity could easily jeopardize their being awarded 
government contracts in the future. 
The overriding goal for the majority of 
companies in my study, in regard to employment 
equity, was to meet compliance of the FCP in 
order to pass a potential audit. What this meant 
was that employment equity was not viewed as a 
business issue. In other words, they did not see 
employment equity as a strategic process which, if 
properly implemented, could positively impact the 
success of the business. Management in most of 
these companies regarded employment equity as 
an additional cost of doing business, rather than an 
aid to competitiveness. 
The lack of any genuine involvement, 
interest and support on the part of executives of 
the majority of these companies indicated that 
employment equity stalled because it is not 
considered a business issue. The executives in 
several of the companies said that employment 
equity had already been achieved, pointing to the 
increased representation of males of Asian 
ancestry as proof. However, this particular 
increase resulted not from equity initiatives, but 
simply because this group comprised a growing 
percentage of engineering graduates. They hired 
who was available. The employment equity 
practitioners who worked with these executives 
had to continually remind them that, yes, there has 
been an increase in the hiring of visible minority 
males, but they were not proportionally 
represented in management. The practitioners also 
reminded the executives that visible minority 
males were only part of one of the designated 
groups; there were three other groups under the 
FCP whose representation needed to be addressed. 
There was a consensus amongst my 
equity colleagues that, without the FCP, their 
companies would never have implemented 
employment equity. However, all the practitioners 
recognized the limitations of the FCP, and most 
agreed that legislating employment equity would 
not necessarily make it a reality. The practitioners 
believed that the most significant obstacle was the 
view of the majority of executives and senior 
managers that employment equity was not a 
business issue, but rather a requirement from a 
customer (the government), to be met with as few 
resources as possible. Although the majority of the 
companies implemented some employment equity 
initiatives, the lack of executive commitment and 
the resulting structural obstacles within these 
organizations ensured that the success of equity 
initiatives was minimal. 
In spite of the challenges and frustrations 
my colleagues and I experienced, we all believed 
that there was a need for employment equity and 
that, although slow, some improvement occurred 
for designated group members. Each of us agreed 
that, before employment equity could become a 
reality, fundamental changes would have to occur 
in the corporate culture of engineering companies. 
It would also require the active participation of 
people throughout the organization, and not just 
us. We recognized that this would involve slow 
change. Although the majority acknowledged that 
quotas would create more rapid change, all agreed 
that this would not be a strategy likely to have 
positive results in the engineering industry. 
Based on my experience, and those of my 
colleagues in the engineering industry, equity 
legislation has had a minimal impact for a number 
of reasons. The FCP did not directly address the 
manifestations of sexism within the engineering 
workplace, nor did it have any authority to 
penalize companies who continued discriminatory 
practices. Further, because of weak design, lack of 
enforcement and limited coverage, the FCP was 
ineffective in making employment equity for 
women in engineering companies a reality. This is 
unfortunate as the only reason all the companies in 
my study implemented employment equity was to 
meet federal government requirements. The strong 
business lobby's influence on the federal 
government resulted in a watered down, 
ineffective program which was excluded from the 
Employment Equity Act and, therefore, not 
legislated. Consequently, while the FCP increased 
administrative work, it created little substantial 
improvement to the designated groups' 
representation or treatment within the workplace. 
The executives of the engineering 
companies in my study were aware both of the 
limitations of the FCP, and that there would be no 
penalty for their failure to comply with its 
guidelines. Therefore, those of us assigned 
responsibility for employment equity were not 
expected to achieve any greater success than 
meeting the administrative requirements of the 
program. In this way, both the companies and the 
federal government gave the appearance of 
addressing the unequal treatment of certain groups 
in the workplace, such as women, without 
changing the reality of working life within 
engineering. 
My colleagues and I believed that 
legislation alone would not make employment 
equity a reality within engineering companies. 
Employment equity legislation could be more 
effective if it were made more substantial, 
enforceable, if it covered all employers and 
addressed the critical importance of areas leading 
up to employment, such as education and 
socialization. In light of attacks on employment 
equity and affirmative action programs in Ontario 
and the US, it is not likely that this will happen in 
the near future. However, even though working 
with limited resources, employment equity 
practitioners and others are committed to opening 
up the challenging and rewarding field of 
engineering to girls and women. The work of 
social activists, combined with a strong demand 
for engineers, will continue to lead to increasing 
numbers of engineers who are members of 
designated groups, not the executives and 
managers of engineering companies or the federal 
employment equity program. 
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